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Beach, 29 Cal.2d 848, 851 [179 P.2d 799], the O'Dea case
considered the pension as vested and not subject to be taken
away. In the Chaney case the change in the law would ad.
versely affect the pensioner and the language indicated the
pensioner could choose the old law or the new law. In the
Brophy case the statute by its language was prospective and
construed to apply to those then receiving pensions. We do
not have language and legislative action equivalent to that
used here in any of the cited cases. The Jordan and Holm.
berg cases are out of harmony with the cases hereinabove
discussed and are disapproved.
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed
to enter judgment in accordance with the views herein ex.
pressed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, .T., Schauer, J., Spence,
,J., and McComb, .J., concurred.
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[S. F. No. 19357.

In Bank.

Feb. 10, 1956.]

GIPSON E. SIMMONS, Appellant, v. RHODES AND
JAMIESON, LTD. (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
[1] Sales-Warranties-Merchantability.-"Merchantable quality"
means that the substance sold is reasonably suitable for the
ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet.
[2] Id.-Warranties-Merchantability.-Where ready-mixed cement purchased to lay a concrete basement floor was fit for
that purpose, this was the only purpose for which the test
of merchantability could be applied.
[3] Id.-Warranties-Cement.-A seller of ready-mixed cement
need not warn the buyer that it will burn the skin, especially
where the buyer knows that quicklime, which has a caustic
effect, is one of the necessary ingredients of cement.
[4] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application of Rule.-In an
action by a buyer of ready-mixed cement against the seller for
burns sustained while using the cement, the doctrine of res
[1] See Cal.Jur., Sales, § 66 et seq.; Am.Jur., Sales, § 341 ct seq.
[4] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence,
§ 295 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Sales,§ 131(1); [3] Sales, § 134.5;
[4, 5] Negligence, § 138 ; [ 6] Negligence, § 135; [7] Evidence, § 18;
[8] Negligence, § 177.
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wns not: applicable since, in lhe absence of evi~
feasible means of discovering the dei'cets or danger
sold, the seller was not liab]f' for an injury
from the use of the eommodity.
[5] Id.~Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application of Rule.- In an action
a
of ready-mixed cement against the seller for burns
sustained while using the cement, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
not npplicahle for the reason that when plaintiff seeks
on the theory that a eommodity contains a foreign
~ubstance and admits that he added material to that delivered
defendant, plaintiff must affirmatively show that the subhe added did not cause the injury.
[6] Id.~Res Ipsa Loquitur-Conduct of Plaintiff as Factor.Plaintiff may properly rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
eYcn though he has participated in the events leading to the
if the evidence excludes his conduct as the responsible
cause~

[7] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowlthat water activates the lime in cement.
[8] Negligence-Nonsuit.-In an action by a buyer of ready-mixed
cmnent against the seller for burns sustained while using the
eement, where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable and there was no negligence on the part of the seller,
nonsuit was properly granted.

"\PPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra
Costa County. Harold Jacoby, J ndge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for breach of warranty and for negligenee. ,Juclgment of nonsuit affirmed.
I\nssell F. King for Appellant.
Rode, Burnhill & Moffitt, L. R. \Veinmann,
John N. James, Hot>y, Hall & Conti, James F. Hoey and
Viadro for Hrspondents.
l\lcCOMB, J.-Plaintiff purchased some ready-mixed cement from defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd., through
its employee, defendant Harold Aydelotte. A.fter using the
mixture for the purpose for which it was intended, plaintiff
suffered severe burns. He brought this action against the two
setting forth causes of action for a breach of
warranty and for negligence. The trial court granted a nonsnit at the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff appeals.
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'l'he facts most favorable to
Plaintiff, a welder by trade, was constructing his own
home.
after laying the foundations, he met defendant
an employee of defendant Rhodes and
Jamieson. Plaintiff showed M:r. Aydelotte around the prem.
ises and particularly the area where it was proposed to lay
the concrete basement floor. The state of construction existing
~1\.ydelotte inspected the premises made it apparent
that such slab could only be laid by working inside the basement area. Aydelotte solicited the sale of cement for his
company, and plaintiff agreed to buy, leaving the type of
mixture up to the seller. At 10:30 a. m. on November 10,
1952, the defendant company delivered its first load of mixed
cement. In order to reach the basement area, the cement was
poured down a chute through a window opening and into
the forms. Plaintiff added 10 gallons of water to it and requested that the succeeding loads be wetter. Three loads in
all were delivered. Because plaintiff had difficulty in spreading the cement he secured the assistance of a neighbor. They
leveled the cement by pushing it into position, using shovels
and a long board for this purpose. During this maneuver
plaintiff frequently got down on his hands and knees to shove
the leveling board. At this time he was wearing galoshes,
jeans, a khaki shirt and rubber gloves. Plaintiff testified that
the galoshes were not worn to protect him from burns but
to protect his feet from getting wet and to enable him to
handle the slick shovel. He also testified that he had never
o;een anyone use rags or padding on his legs to protect
them from the cement. He had observed that most cement
workers worked while standing on boards, but believed they
did this to keep from getting wet and dirty. No one had
ever warned him of the danger of getting burned by cement,
although he did know that exposure to wet cement caused a
drying out of the skin. Prior to the accident he had had some
experience with laying cement. On none of these occasions,
although he had handled the cement with his bare hands, had
he ever been injured by the use of the cement other than a
roughening of the skin of his hands.
Plaintiff worked leveling the cement floor from 10 :30 a. m.
to 3 :15 p. m. During half of this period his knees and legs
were in contact with the wet cement. Shortly after 1 p. m.
plaintiff began to notice a ''tingle'' on his legs, which became
increasingly irritating. He continued to work, however, until
the job was finished. 'l'hereafter he washed his legs with soap
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n, rnedieation
and he was allowr(l to go home. Plaintiff refor further treatment. 'l'>vo
the next
's
It was then dishe ·was
15 per cent of the
, most of the burns being of the third degree
two extensive skin grafting operations were
and
was hospitalized for nearly two
doctor testified that plaintiff v;,;as not allergic to
aml ''in my opinion this was definitely a chemical burn,
ro eon tact with cement."
breach of warranty was reasonably and properly
evidence, on both causes of action, at the close of
a nonsni.t was granted.
are presented :

Fms·r
there was an implied warranty of fitness
purpose of laying a basement floor including a secwarranty that the cement was reasonably safe to
did the evidencn disclose a breach of warranty?
17:35 of the Ci dl Code provides in part: ". . . there
warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract
except as follows:
..Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
to the seller the particular purpose for which the
required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or
or not), there is an imp1ied warranty that
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
\Vl1ere the goods are bought by description from a
deals in goods of that description (whether he
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality."
claims a breach of implied warranty under the proof the foregoing section, his theory being that the
Cl'ment was not of merchantable quality.
Xo evidence was introduced to show that this crment con46 C.2d-7
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tained any unusual substance or differed from ordinary
cement in any way.
[1] "Merchantable quality" means that the substance sold
is reasonably suitable for the ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet. ( 27 Words and Phrases ( perm.ed. 1940), 1955
Pocket Part, p. 26.)
[2] It is conceded that the cement vms fit for the purpose
of laying a basement floor. 'fhis is the only purpose for
which the test of merchantability could be applied under the
facts of the present case. [3] 'l'here is likewise no merit
in the proposition that the cement had a concealed or hidden
danger unknown to plaintiff and that defendant should have
warned him that it would burn the skin. The injury occurred
in the handling of a standard and common commodity.
Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 [7 S.Ct. 696, 30 L.Ed.
810], relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable to the facts
in this case. In the cited case defendant sold rags to the
plaintiff for the purpose of manufacturing paper. The rags
were infected vvith smallpox and, although they were made
into satisfactory paper, several of plaintiff's employees died
of smallpox in the process. There the court properly held
there was a breach of warranty of fitness because rags are
not normally infected with smallpox. In the present case,
quicklime, which has a caustic effect, is one of the necessary
ingredients of cement, and it is unquestioned that plaintiff
was familiar with this fact.
SECOND

vV as there a showing of negligence upon the part of defendants?
No.
[ 4] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not here applicable because in the absence, as in the present case, of
evidence of feasible means of discovering the defects or
danger in the commodity sold, the seller is not liable for
an injury resulting from the use of the commodity. (Honea
v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 618 [3] et seq. [140 P.2d
369].)
The only evidence of any testing was that defendant Rhodes
and Jamieson, Ltd., had its product tested for proper proportions of materials to be used for various types of construction.
[5] In addition, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not
here applicable for the reason that when a plaintiff seeks
recovery upon the theory that a commodity contains a foreign
substance and admits that he added material to that delivered
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plaintiff must
show that the
substance he added did not cause the injury.
v. Coca
[247 P.2d 344] .)
Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 444
Plaintiff may properly rely upon the doctrine of res
even thongh he has participated in the events
to the accident if the evidence exeludes his conduct
cause.
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
the ease at bar, plaintiff did not offer any evidence to
show that the water which he had added to the cement ball
no effeet.
[7] It is a matter of common knowledge that >rater actin<tes the lime in cement. (See Dalton v. Pioneer Sand &;
Co., 37 Wn.2d 946 [227 P.2d 173, 174 et srq.]; also
"llmr." \Yebstrr's Krw Internat. Diet. (2d eel. 1950), p.
1±33; G Bncy. Britannica (1951 eel.), p. 207.) A street superintendent testified that lime does not give off heat until it
becomes wet. Obviously, thinning the solution would allow
it to soak through the plaintiff's clothes more quickly.
Therefore, it is clear that when plaintiff added water
to the cement, additional heat was created and the thinning
of the cement caused the quicklime to be more readily absorbed by his clothing, which in turn resulted in his being
burned.
Our eonclnsiou is fully in accord with t\yo recent decisions
of this court. In LaPm·tc v. Houston, ml Cal.2d 167 at 170
P.2d 665], Mr. Chief ,Justice Gibson, speaking for the
court said: "It ·was at least equally probable that the accident was caused by some fault in the mechanism of the car
for which defendants were not liable as that it resulted from
any negligent act or omission of the mechanic. Accordingly,
it ,·annot be said that it is more likely than not that tbe
aceidfmt \Vas caused by the negligence of defendants, and
h<'llt:e the case was not a proper one for the application of
the rloetrine of res ipsa loquitur." In Burr Y. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682 at 691 [268 P.2d 10411, the Chief
Ju,;t
speaking for a unanimous court, said: ''The instrnet ions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they
to state all the conditions under which res ipsa
would be applieable, they did not inform the jury
that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality 1vhich cansect
thfo damage wm; not mishandled or its condition otherwise
after control was relinqwishcd by the person against
whom the doctrine is to be applied." (Italics added.)
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[8] Since the doctrine of res
loquitur is not applicable
under the facts of the instant case and there is a total absence
of any negligence upon the part of defendants, the nonsuit was properly granted upon the second alleged cause of
action.
The
is affirmed.

tic

and
concurred.
J.-I dissent.
I disagree with the majority on both the
of implied warranty and breach thereof and res ipsa loquitur.
'l'he majority opinion omits important facts and states, contrary to the record, that there is no evidence on crucial
points.
As appears more fully from the opinion of Mr. Presiding
Justice Peters, hereinafter set forth, in speaking for the
District Court of Appeal in this case, that there is evidence
that the implied warranty of merchantability was breached
because there is evidence that the cement caused the severe
burns suffered by plaintiff and that such burns are not to be
expected from the use of properly mixed concrete. Plaintiff
did not know of the danger and defendant, producer of the
material, must be presumed to know the character of its
product.
On the issue of res ipsa loquitur, and the inference of
negligence arising therefrom, the same above mentioned evidence is present. It is not important that defendant's tests
did not reveal the dangerous character of the concrete. The
evidence shows that ordinarily concrete does not cause burns.
It follows that as this concrete, over which defendant exercised control, did cause burns, there is an inference of
defendant's negligence.
As above stated I adopt the opinion of Mr. Presiding
Justice Peters as follows :
"Plaintiff, Gipson Simmons, purchased some ready-mixed
cement from defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd., through
its employee, defendant Harold Aydelotte. After using the
mixture for the purpose for which it was intended plaintiff
suffered severe burns. He brought this action against the
two defendants, setting forth causes of action for a breach
of warranty and for negligence. The trial court granted a
nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff appeals.
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was
foundaof defendant
around the
area
it
concrete basement floor, an area
state of construction existing when Aydethe
made it apparent that snch
be
by working inside the basement area.
sale of cement for his company, and
to buy, leaving the type of mixture up to the
At 10 :30 a. m. of November 10, 1952, the defendant
company delivered its first load of mixed cement. In order
basement area the cement was poured down a
vlliVU~ll a window opening and into the forms. Because
mixture was not wet enough, the plaintiff added 10 gallons
water to it and requested that the succeeding loads be
loads in all were delivered. Because plaintiff
uuuvLl.L".r in spreading the cement he secured the assistance
They leveled the cement by pushing it into
shovels and a long board for this purpose.
this maneuver plaintiff frequently got down on his
and knees to shove the leveling board. At this time
wearing galoshes, jeans, a khaki shirt and rubber
Plaintiff testified that the galoshes and gloves were
worn to
him from burns, but to protect his feet
,.,t<r1n,ry wet and to enable him to handle the slick shoveL
also testified that he had never seen anyone use
padding on <his legs to protect them from the
He had observed that most cement workers worked
o~a,uu•LLE. on boards, but
they did this to keep
!<,I;;!,LUJL~ wet and dirty. No one had ever warned him
u"''"'"'".~. of getting burned by cement, although he did
that exposure to wet cement caused a drying out of
skin.
l::'la,mtatr, prior to the accident, had had some experience
cement. He had helped to build some cement water
had helped two neighbors pour cement foundations
and had occasionally poured cement while workconstruction crews. On none of these occasions,
he had handled the cement barehanded, had he
been injured by the use of the cement other than a roughof the skin of his hands.
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"Plaintiff worked leveling the cement floor from 10:30
a. m. to 3 :15 p. m. During half of this period his knees
and legs were in contact with the wet cement. His neighbor
assistant did not come in direct contact with the wet cement
to the same extent as did plaintiff. Shortly after 1 p. m.
plaintiff began to notice a 'tingle' on his legs which became
increasingly irritating. He continued to work, however, because of the necessity of leyeling the floor before the cement
set. Upon finishing the job he washed his legs with soap and
~water, observed that his legs 'looked green,' changed his
clothes and got a neighbor to drive him to the hospital. There
he was bathed again, medication placed on his legs, penicillin
administered, and his attending doctor, because there were no
beds available in the hospital, allowed him to go home. Plaintiff returned to the hospital the next day for further treatment,
and the doctor visited him at home. Two days after the
exposure to the cement plaintiff's temperature reached 103
degrees and the doctor had him hospitalized. It was then
discovered that plaintiff was severely burned over 15 per
cent of the area of his body, most of the burns being of the
third degree type. This means that for the most part the
burn extended through the entire thickness of the skin, that
is, through both the epidermis and corium and down to the
subcutaneous fatty tissue. This required two extensive skin
grafting operations, the first, with three doctors, requiring
8 hours, and the second 5% hours. Plaintiff was hospitalized
for nearly two months. rrhe doctor testified that plaintiff
was not allergic to cement, and that 'in my opinion this was
definitely a chemical burn, due to contact with cement.'
Although defendant claims that this answer was stricken, no
order striking it was made. At any rate, the fact that the
burns ·were caused by contact with the cement is at least a
reasonable, if not inevitable, inference.
''The street superintendent of Richmond, after qualifying
as an expert in concrete construction, testified that during
his 25 years of experience he had seen men many times work
for three or four hour periods in cement doing hand troweling
without the protection of boards or padding, and during
that entire time he had never seen a man burned to the extent
of requiring medical care, having observed, at most, a few
pimples or chapping caused by the exposure to the cement.
'l'he attending physician testified that prior to treating plaintiff he had observed but one prior burn caused by exposure
to concrete, and that was a small burn. He also testified
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that there was very little medical literature on the subject
of cement burns, he having seen only one article on the subject.
Tn that artide no case was reported so severe as to rrquire
skin grafting.
drrmatologist, vvho had examined and treated plaintiff,
that he had never seen or hrard or rrad of a concret('
burn as extensive or
as that suffered
plaintiff, and
that the burn suffered by plaintiff IYas a chemical burn which,
in his opinion, based on the history of the ease, vYas due to
the ecment or some snbstanee in it. 'l'he burn was not caused
bY an allergy towards cement. This had been determined
· eertain allergy tests of various kinds of cement, including
one test made from the very slab here involved.
"Notice of breach of warranty was reasonably and properly
"On this evidence, on both causes of action, at the close
of plaintiff's case, a nonsuit was granted.
"Propriety of Nonsuit on Warranty Cause of Action
'' Seetion 1735 of the Civil Code provides :
" ' . . . there is no implied warranty or condition as to
the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follo·ws:
"' (1) ·where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for whieh the
are reqnired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the
seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufaeturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
" '(2) ·where the goods are bought by description from
the seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he
lw the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.'
"Clearly, it was proper to grant the nonsuit as to defendant
as to this cause of action. Obviously, he was the
agent of Rhodes and Jamieson, and was not himself the seller
\Yiihin the meaning of the section.
''As to defendant Rhodes and Jamieson it appears that for
the pnrposes of a nonsuit, all the elements required by the
section can be found in the evidence or in reasonable
inferences therefrom. There can be no reasonable doubt
that plaintiff made known to the agent of the seller the parti<•ular pnrpose for whieh the goods were required. It is also
a reasonable inference that plaintiff relied on the seller's skill
and judgment to pick the proper type and mixture of cement
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for the
There is no dispute that the cement furnished
made a
cement floor. If it be assumed that the warranty
here involved includes a warranty that the cement was safe
to handle, a
later discussed, then it seems clear that
it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that plaintiff
relied on the seller's skill and
as to the cement
safe to handle.
to the seller's
had
no means of
the
and could not be reasonably
expected to do so. The evidence shows that the seller used
the service of a
laboratory. Thus, it can reasonably
be inferred that plaintiff relied upon the seller's superior
knowledge as to the safety in handling the cement.
''The only debatable question is whether the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose includes not only
the primary warranty that the cement was fit for the purpose
of a cement floor, but also a secondary warranty that the
cement was reasonably safe to han9-le in constructing the
floor. On this subject there is a difference of opinion. There
is at least one out-of-state authority directly in support of
the seller's contention that the implied warranty here involved
does not include a warranty of reasonable safety in handling.
The case is Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wn.2d
946 [227 P.2d 173]. There, as here, ready-mixed cement was
purchased to construct a cement floor and the purchaser, while
laying the floor, received severe burns from coming into
contact with the cement. There, as here, the purchaser relied
upon a breach of the implied warranty. A motion for dismissal was granted at the close of plaintiff's case. This was
affirmed. The opinion on the point in question is quite short,
contains no analysis of the nature of the warranty, and cites
no cases in support of its conclusions. The court first pointed
out (p. 174) that: 'No evidence was introduced to show that
this cement contained any unusual substance, or differed
from ordinary cement in any way.'* The court then disposed
of the point in the following cursory manner: ' "Merchantable quality" means that the substance sold is reasonably
suitable for the ordinary uses it was manufactured to meet.
27 'N ords and Phrases, Perm. Eel., Pocket Part. No contention is made by the appellant that the cement was not satisfactory for the purpose of laying a basement floor. This
is the only purpose for which the test of merchantability
*"In this respect the Washington case differs from our case. In our
case there is evidence from which it can be inferred that exposure to
cement normally does not cause severe burns to the user.
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are not
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was a
of the
several
article's use.
' a
Dushane
S.Ot. 696,
810 J, the seller sold the
to be used in
manufacture of paper. The rags were infected with
\;V orkmcn in the
became infected. The
product-the paper-was
not dangerous
the manufacturing proeess killed the germs. But
m•yerthE'less the court held that there vvas a breaeh of the
of fitness for a particular purpose. After setting
the facts, the court stated
646) : ''fhis was of itself
infected rags] sufficient evidence to be submitted
of a warranty and a breach of it. A "Warranty,
or implied, that rags sold are fit to be manufactured
paper, is broken, not only if they will not make good
papee, but equally if they cannot be made into paper at all,
1Yithout killing or sickening those
m the manu-

cases
'Plaintiff' also cites a series of clothing and
are not directly in point. In all of them clothing or
cosmetics caused injury to the wearer or user. In all of them
court found a breach of the implied "Warranty. In such
ca-;es the purpose for which the clothing or cosmetics were
was to wear or use them. Obviously, if
could not
worn or used safely they >vere not fit for the purpose
which they were sold. 'l'hus, the cases are not directly
In one of them, however-the case of F'lynn v.
Co., 242 lVIass. 450 [136 N.E.
27 A.L.R. 1504]appears the following pertinent language
253) :
" 'It well may be that the scope of an implied warranty
of fitness does not extend to :fitness in
of matters
unknown to the dealer and peculiar to the individual
A seller of food presumably does not warrant that
the particular kind of food which the buyer calls for will
suited to his peculiar idiosyncracies . . . . But it appears
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that the particular ''defect'' which injured the plaintiff would
have similarly injured any normal person . . . .
'' 'The scope of the statutory implied warranty cannot
be limited so as to exclude a warranty against the latent
presence of foreign substances which are injurious in the
course of the normal use of the garment for the purpose
intended.'
''Although the exploding bottle case of Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P.2d 436], is not directly
in point, in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor,
at page 464, there appears some language that is helpful. It
is as follows: 'The retailer, even though not equipped to test
a product, is under an absolute liability to his customer, for
the implied warranties of fitness for proposed use and merchantable quality include a warranty of safety of the product.'
''On principle it would be unreasonable and unjust to
hold that the warranty is limited to the safety of the end
product and does not include a warranty that the goods furnished can be safely used in the construction of the end
product. For that reason we are impressed with the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in the Dushane case
and are not impressed with the reasoning of the Washington
court in the Dalton ease. We, therefore, hold that for
purposes of nonsuit there was an implied warranty that
the cement was reasonably safe for the purpose of laying a
concrete floor.
"The next question is whether there was any evidence of
a breach of this warranty. In this connection, it must be
kept in mind that as to this warranty the seller is not an
insurer that the goods can be used with absolute safety or
that they are perfectly adapted to the intended use. Section
1735 of the Civil Code merely requires that the goods be
'reasonably fit' for the intended use. (See also Tremerolri v.
Austin Trailm· Equip. Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 464 [227 P.2d
923]; JJlix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674 [59 P.2d
144] .)
''On this question of breach, it is a matter of common
knowledge, and was known to plaintiff, that cement contains
lime. Plaintiff knew that lime is a caustic, and that exposure
to it irritated the skin. Plaintiff also knew that cement
workers customarily wore boots and worked from boards,
although he testified that he thought that the purpose of
this was to keep from getting dirty, not to keep from getting
burned.
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the other hand, there is direct evidence that these
were of unusual severity, and it can be inferred that
burns do not normally oecur upon exposure to wet cement.
'rhe street superintendent testified that he had seen men
unprotected in wet cement for long periods and never
seen anyone burned, although he had observed some chapand some pimples. Both doctors testified that they had
nev•:r seen, heard or read of a case of cement burn severe
to require skin grafting. Plaintiff was not peculiarly
allergic to cement. 'l'he evidence shows that it was reasonnecessary, in laying the floor, at least by an amateur,
for plaintiff to expose himself to the cement, and that defendant knew the conditions under which the cement was
to be used.
''For the purposes of a nonsuit, there can be no doubt
that the evidence shO\YS that the cement caused the burn.
The two doctors so testified, and the hospital record indicated
a eement burn. The irritation started two hours after exposnre to the wet cement, and there is no evidence that
plaintiff came into contact with any other substance that
conld have caused the burn.
'' 'J'hus, for the purposes of defeating a nonsuit, there was
ample evidence of a breach of the warranty of fitness.
"It was, therefore, error to grant a nonsuit on the implied
cause of action.
"\Ve now turn to the negligence cause of action. There
is 110 evidence that defendant Aydelotte was negligent or had
any control OYer the cement mixture. The nonsuit was proper
as to him on this cause of action.
"As to defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd., whether
the nonsuit was properly granted depends upon 11hether the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the facts. There
has been a great deal written as to the scope of this doctrine
ill recent years, mueh of it by the California courts. It is
not necessary to review those many cases in this opinion.
It i,., now settl0d that the doctrine applies (1) if it can be
reasonably concluded from a basis of experience, either common to the community, or brought out in the evidence, that
Ow acei<lent is of a kind that dol's not normally occur unless
SOJJl(:one "IYas m~gligcnt; (2) and, if it \Yas caused by an
instrumentality in the exclusive control of the defendant;
c:n and, if it was not eontributed to by a voluntar~· aetion
on the part of the plaintiff. (See generally Ybarra v. Span25 Cal.2cl 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R 1258] ; Escola
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a
As was said
43 Cal.2d 287, 292 [ 272
is met 'where it appears that
such a nature that it can be said, in the
that
probably was the result of
someone and that the defendant is probably
the person who is
also, in addition to the
authorities
snpra, LaPorte v. Hanston, 33 Cal.2d 167
; Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitttr in Cal'ifornia,
[199 P.2d
87 Cal.L.Rev.
at p. 195.)
"It is
elear
for the pmpose of getting by a
nonsuit, the third requirement-reasonableness of use by the
here shown. The plaintiff, of course, assumed
the normal risks of the ordinary effects of exposure to wet
of the skin and a rash-but there is no
evidence or no inference from the evidence that as a reasonable man he
or should have known, that there was a
third
burns. In fact, the inference is quite
The defendant knew that the cement had to
from
the
and knew, or should have
knowu, that exposure to the wet cement was reasonably
possible. 'fhe method used to spread the cement was reasonable under the circumstances.
''On this
from a judgment of nonsuit we are, of
course, not concerned ·with contributory negligence. That is
an affirmative
and can only be involved if the evidence shows, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was contributively negligent. No such showing was here made.
''The
debatable issue is whether the defendant had
'exclusive control' of the instrumentality causing the injury.
In this connection thr courts have held that the fact the
accident occurred sonwt1me after the defendant relinquished
eontrol of the
causing the injury does not,
pe1· se,
the application of the doctrine, nor does the
fact that the defendant may not be iu a better position than
plaintiff to explain the accident preclude its application if
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" or "conwhich caused the
l
It has been stated that the purpose
requirement is to eliminate the
that the
was caused by someone other than the defendant.
authorities.] Accordingly, its use
merely to aid
in determining whether, under the
rule, it
probable than not that the
\Yas the result of
the
negligence.
" 'The requirement of control is not an absolute one>.
as we have seen, the doctrine '.Vill not ordinarily
if it is c>qually probable that the negligence was that
of someone other than the
the
need not
all other persons who
have been rewhere the defendant's
appears to be
probable explanation of the accident.
[Citing
Further, it is settled that the fact that the
occurs some time after the defendant relinquishes
of the instrumentality which causes the accident
(loes
preclude application of the doctrine
there
is eddence that the instrumentality had not been improperly
the plaintiff or some third persons, or its condition
changed, after control vvas relinquished by the
[Citing cases.] Of course, it must appear that
the defendant had sufficient control or connection with the
that it can be said that he was more probably than
person responsible for plaintiff's
. As recently held by the
Court of Oregon
well reasoned opinion, a plaintiff may properly rely
res ipsa loquitur even though he has participated in
eyents leading to the accident if the evidence excludes his
(:onduct as the responsible cause. ( Gow v. JJiultnomah Hotel,
191 Ore. 45 [224 P.2d 552, 555-560, 228 P.2d 791].)'
the agency or
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''The court also discussed what place the question of the
defendant's superior knowledge of the cause of the accident
has in the application of the doctrine, in the following language (p. 445):
'' 'Another factor which some of the cases have considered
in applying the doctrine is that the defendant may have
superior knowledge of what occurred and that the chief evidence of the cause of the accident may be accessible to the
defendant but inaccessible to the plaintiff. [Citing authorities.] It seems clear, however, that the doctrine may be
applied even though the defendant is not in a better position
than plaintiff to explain what occurred if it appears more
probable than not that the injury resulted from negligence
on the part of defendant. [Citing authorities.] '
''The court then went on to hold that there was a duty
on the part of the bottling company to inspect and test the
bottles for defects, and that the fact the bottles were furnished
by another did not preclude application of the doctrine.
''The problem involved in the instant case is that the cement
used by defendant in its mixture was furnished by the Ideal
Cement Company. Ideal is not a party to this action. We
have no way of knowing, nor has the plaintiff, whether the
overly dangerous qualities of the mixture were the result of
the defendant's actions, or whether it was caused solely by
the cement furnished by Ideal. Either possibility is reasonable. But even if it be assumed that it is more reasonable
that the burns were caused by the cement and not by anything
the defendant added, this would not preclude the application
of the doctrine as to defendant. vVhen the defendant uses
a material in a mixture that it sells, such defendant is under
a duty to inspect reasonably that material to determine
whether the material incorporated in its product is defective.
This is certainly so where, as here, the defendant knows,
or should know, that the plaintiff has no means of testing
the product. Although the doctrine is not applicable where
it is at least equally probable that the accident was caused
by another (LaPorte v. Houston, 33 Cal.2d 167 [199 P.2d
665]), this rule is not applicable where the defendant is
under a duty to inspect. This was the precise holding in
the Escola and Zentz cases, cited supra. Although it appears
that defendant used the services of a testing firm, the nature
and scope of such service, or its reasonableness, do not appear
in the evidence. The reasonableness of such inspection, if

8
\

c
t

(

1
t

I
2

§

c

1

r

t

I

SIMMONS

v.

RHODES

&

JAMIESON, LTD.

207

[46 C.lld 1911; 293 P.2d 261

any,
of course, a matter of defense, and here the nonsuit
was granted at the close of plaintiff's case.
''There was evidence that plaintiff added water to the
after he received possession, but there was no evidence
this in any way was unreasonable or contributed to the
Whether plaintiff handled the product reasonably
possession is a question of fact for the jury.
•~n,..n.n"' v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Ca1.2d.514 (203 P.2d 522] .)
mere fact that water was added does not make the doctrine
inapplicable as a matter of law. In the Zentz ease the plainput ice around the coke bottle. This was held not to
preclude the application of the doctrine. The two situations
are comparable.
"For the foregoing reasons we conclude that on the neglieause of action the plaintiff, with the aid of the doctrine
res ipsa loquitur, made out a case sufficient to put the
on defendant to show that it acted as a reasonable
prudent person would act under the circumstances.
''Thus, on both causes of action, it was error to grant the
''The judgment is affirmed as to defendant Aydelotte; it
is reversed as to defendant Rhodes and Jamieson, Ltd. Plainto recover costs from defendant Rhodes and Jamieson,

"
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 8,
Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

